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Abstract
Cooperation for public goods poses a dilemma, where individuals
are tempted to free ride on others’ contributions. Classic solutions in-
volve monitoring, reputation maintenance and costly incentives, but
there are important collective actions based on simple and cheap cues
only, for example unplanned protests and revolts, as well as coopera-
tion in other species. This can be explained by an Ising model with
the assumption that individuals in uncertain situations tend to con-
form to the local majority in their network. Among initial defectors,
noise such as rumors or opponents’ provocations causes some of them
to cooperate accidentally. At a critical level of noise, these coopera-
tors trigger a cascade of cooperation. We find an analytic relationship
between the phase transition and the asymmetry of the Ising model,
which in turn reflects the asymmetry of cooperation and defection.
This study thereby shows that in principle, the dilemma of coopera-
tion can be solved by nothing more than a portion of random noise.
People may want to realize or preserve public goods, for example democ-
racy and clean air, but because contributors are disadvantaged in the face
of free riders, there is a dilemma [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Solutions typically require
efforts, hence costs, of the participants who have to monitor one another [6]
and spread information (gossip) [7] through their network reliably [8], upon
which some of them have to deliver individual rewards or (threats of) pun-
ishments [9]. All this comes on top of the costs of contributing to the public
good.
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In some situations, participants self-organize into cooperation without
costly social mechanisms or reliable information. Cases in point are spon-
taneous help at disasters, non-organized revolts against political regimes
[10, 11, 12] and street fights between groups of young men when one of
them unexpectedly insults another. Also several animal species manage to
cooperate without costly mechanisms, for example buffalo herd bulls who
chase away prowling lions [13]. These situations have in common a high
uncertainty of outcomes, benefits and costs. Participants who identify with
their group members [14], or feel group solidarity [15], then use the heuristic
of conformism to the majority of their network neighbors [16, 17], which can
be observed in synchronous motion, gestures or shouting [18, 19]. Causes
of conformism can be cultural, genetic or both [20]. To explain cooperation
under conformism, we use an Ising model [21, 22, 23, 24, 25].
Model
The group g of individuals who take an interest in a public good is modeled as
a connected network with weighted and usually asymmetric ties Aij denoting
i paying attention to j. Consistent with models of social influence that yield
good experimental predictions [26], the adjacency matrix is row-normalized,
yielding cell values aij = Aij/
∑
j Aij, hence
∑
j aij = 1.
Individuals have two behavioral options, defect (D) and cooperate (C),
0 < D < C, and all defect at the start. The average degree of cooperation
among n individuals is described by M = 1/n
∑n
i=1 Si (originally the order
parameter of magnetization), where the behavioral variable Si can take the
(spin) value Si = C or Si = −D, for example S = {1,−1/2}. Ties and
behavior are expressed in the conventional, here asymmetric, Ising model
H = −
n∑
i 6=j
aijSiSj. (1)
Solving the model boils down to minimizing H [27], where H/n can be in-
terpreted as average dissatisfaction.
Dilemma’s of cooperation are usually analyzed by game theory in terms
of payoffs [5]. A group of defectors at a baseline payoff level, usually zero,
can get higher payoffs (in our case lower H) if all, or most, individuals coop-
erate, but because nobody wants to be exploited by free riders while being
tempted to free ride themselves, it is a non-trivial challenge to reach the co-
operative state. Our Ising model has these two states in common with game
theory, and expresses the difficulty to reach the cooperative state in terms of
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a (free energy) barrier, illustrated qualitatively in Fig. 1(a). A difference with
game theory is that there, collective defection does not yield a payoff benefit
whereas it does yield a conformity benefit (low H) in the Ising model. After
analyzing the model’s behavior, we will elaborate the model’s relationship to
payoffs.
The high-uncertainty situations to which the model applies are charac-
terized by turmoil, T , or temperature in the original model. It produces
noise [28] in individuals’ information about the situation, which in turn be-
comes partly false, ambiguous, exaggerated or objectively irrelevant. Sources
of noise can be rumors, fires, insults and violence. Noise entails “trembling
hands” [29] as game theorists say, which means a chance that some indi-
viduals accidentally change their behavior from D to C (or the other way
around). The turmoil and its noise also cause arousal, which makes everyone
more susceptible to one another. An accidental cooperator may then cause
a cascade of cooperation, as we will see. An example of turmoil and its ram-
ifications is the self-immolation of a street vendor in December 2010, which,
in the given circumstances, set off the Tunisian revolution. Other examples
are the revolutions in East Germany [10] and Romania in 1989 and in Egypt
and Syria in 2011 [30], where protesters were heated up by rumors about
the events in neighboring countries. Autocratic rulers try to prevent their
downfall by suppressing turmoil, for instance by tightening media control.
Noise is different from a stable bias, for instance the ideology of an auto-
cratic regime, which entails revolutions against it less often than a weakening
regime, or stumbling opponents in street fights. Opponents’ weakness gives
off noisy signals that they might be overcome, which readily entail collec-
tive actions against them [31, 32, 33]. Whereas responses to noise are typi-
cally spontaneous, collective responses to stable signals, biased or not, tend
to be mounted by organized groups with selective incentives and all that
[11, 12, 32]. Moreover, organized groups can generate turmoil by themselves,
for instance a burst of activity online [34]. Combinations of signal and noise
also occur, of course, which can result in, for example, an organized peace-
ful demonstration to suddenly turn violent. Our focus is on spontaneous
cooperation.
Results
Our general result is that within finite time and at low turmoil, cooperation
does not get off the ground, but it does emerge at a critical level Tc. This
pattern is illustrated by the red line in Fig. 1(b) along the direction of the
arrows. It corresponds to a social dynamics where few and far between co-
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Figure 1: Cooperation for public goods. (a) Mean dissatisfaction H/n and
level of cooperation M . When all defect, H/n is at a local minimum, on
the left, but to proceed to the global minimum where all cooperate, on
the right, participants are hindered by a hill. (b) Mean field analysis with
S = {1,−1/2} shows below Tc one stable state with mostly cooperators, at
the top, and another stable state in finite time with mostly defectors, at the
bottom. A metastable state in between, indicated by the dotted line, corre-
sponds to the hill top in Fig. 1(a). Above Tc only one state remains, where
with increasing T , cooperators are joined by increasing numbers of defectors.
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Figure 2: Consequences of shifting S0 with the mean field approach (MF),
keeping ∆ = 0.75. (a) With increasing S0, less agitation is necessary to turn
defectors into cooperators. For comparison, numerical simulations on several
random networks with density = 0.8 are shown as well. (b) The proportion
of defectors pc at Tc decreases with increasing S0.
operators trigger a cascade of cooperation at Tc, as we found in numerical
simulations. If T keeps increasing way beyond Tc, cooperators co-exist with
increasing numbers of defectors, until the two behaviors become equally fre-
quent. If in actuality cooperation then collapses completely is an issue for
further study. Otherwise cooperation ends when the public good is achieved,
the participants run out of steam, or others intervene.
Comparison with the symmetric Ising model
Rewriting the asymmetric Ising model in a symmetric form enables a direct
comparison with results in the literature for symmetric models, and a gen-
eralization to arbitrary values of S = {C,−D}. A model with asymmetric
values can be reformulated as a symmetric model with an offset, or bias,
S0 = (C −D)/2 and an increment ∆ = (C +D)/2 by the mapping
S = {C,−D} → {S0 + ∆, S0 −∆} (2)
Accordingly, the values chosen in Fig. 1(b), S = {1,−1/2}, imply ∆ = 0.75
and S0 = 0.25. Substitution of S0 and Sˆi chosen from {∆,−∆} in H yields
H = −
∑
ij
aij(S0 + Sˆi)(S0 + Sˆj). (3)
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Expanding H in orders of S0 yields
−
∑
ij
aijSˆiSˆj − S0
(∑
ij
aijSˆi +
∑
ij
aijSˆj
)
− S20
∑
ij
aij. (4)
The first term in the expansion Hsym = −
∑
ij aijSˆiSˆj is a symmetric model
with the same adjacency matrix as the original asymmetric model. The
second term Hloc = −S0(
∑
ij aijSˆi +
∑
ij aijSˆj) is proportional to S0 and can
be interpreted as a local field that modifies Hsym. The contribution of this
local field can be expressed in terms of row and column sums of aij as
Hloc = −S0
∑
i
(∑
j
aij +
∑
j
aji
)
Sˆi. (5)
For row-normalized adjacency matrices, with
∑
j aij = 1 for all rows i, Hloc
becomes
Hrowloc = −S0
∑
i
(∑
j
aij
)
Sˆi − S0
∑
i
Sˆi, (6)
where the first term is a local field varying for each Sˆi, and the second term
is a homogeneous external field independent of aij. The third term in the
expansion of H is independent of the values of Sˆ and is a constant depending
on aij only. Hence it does not play a role in the minimization of H. For a
connected network with row-normalization, the last expression can be further
simplified to
Hrowloc = −2S0
∑
i
Sˆi. (7)
The asymmetry in S is then equivalent to a symmetric system with an ex-
ternal field 2S0.
Mean field analysis
The expected value of M as function of T can be obtained by assuming that
the network is very large and by abstracting away from its topology; in the
language of thermodynamics, by approximating the interaction energy by
the energy of one spin in the mean field of its neighbors [27], M = 〈S〉. The
value of M can now be expressed in closed form in terms of the probabilities
given by the exponential of the Hamiltonian energy and T as
M =
(S0 −∆)e
(S0−∆)M
T + (S0 + ∆)e
(S0+∆)M
T
e
(S0−∆)M
T + e
(S0+∆)M
T
. (8)
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This reduces to an implicit relation
M
∆
=
S0
∆
+ tanh
(
∆2
T
M
∆
)
, (9)
where only dimensionless ratios of M , S0 and T with ∆ remain in the ex-
pression. The mean degree 〈k〉, defined for binary ties, does not occur in
it because the adjacency matrix is row-normalized and the mean weighted
outdegree 〈kw〉 = 1.
By analyzing the intersection of the line defined by M/∆−S0/∆ and the
tanh term on the right hand side of Eq. 9, the possible values for M at a given
T can be found. For T > Tc there is one stable high T solution and for T < Tc
there is one stable solution of (nearly) full cooperation, another solution that
is stable in finite time with (nearly) full defection, and one unstable solution.
At T = Tc the two stable solutions merge and the intersecting line coincides
with the tangent line touching the tanh function; see Fig. 1(b). At that point
a closed relation for Tc in terms of S0 and ∆ can be found,
S0
∆
=
√
γ−1
γ+1
(γ + 1)γ − cosh−1(γ)
γ2
, (10)
where γ =
√
∆2
Tc
. Eq. 10 is used in Fig. 2(a). It shows that if S0 increases
while keeping ∆ constant, less agitation is required to motivate defectors to
cooperate. When ∆ decreases to ∆ = S0, defection loses its appeal. The
figure also shows that numerical simulations yield very similar results for
large networks but diverge for small ones. This also holds true for Tc in
Fig 1, which is lower for smaller networks (not shown).
From the mean field approximation follows the proportion of defectors
pc and cooperators 1 − pc at given S0 and pertaining Tc, after a time long
enough for the system to settle down. The proportion of cooperators 1−pc is
called critical mass in the literature [35], and can be inferred from the value
of Mc at the phase transition,
Mc = pc(S0 −∆) + (1− pc)(S0 + ∆). (11)
The mean field analysis of Tc yields
Mc
∆
=
−cosh−1(γ)
γ2
. (12)
Note that the cosh−1 function in Eq. 12 only yields a result when γ > 1, and
sets a limit to Tc for given ∆. For the choice ∆ = 0.75, the maximum value
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of Tc = ∆
2 = 0.565. Solving for pc yields
pc =
1
2
− S0
2∆
+
1
2
cosh−1(γ)
γ2
, (13)
used for Fig. 2(b). It shows that the proportion of defectors pc at Tc decreases
with increasing S0. In contrast to critical mass theory, however, the Ising
model has no assumptions about initiative takers or leaders who win over
the rest [35], rational decision making [35] or learning [36].
Payoffs
We now interpret the asymmetric Ising model in terms of a public goods
game. A widely used definition [5] of payoffs for cooperators ΠgC and defectors
ΠgD in a group g is
ΠgC = r(NC + 1)/G− 1,
ΠgD = rNC/G, (14)
with r > 1 an enhancement, or synergy, factor of cooperation, NC the number
of cooperators around the player for which the payoff is calculated, and G
the total group size.
The asymmetric Ising model can be interpreted as a public goods game
by using, respectively, defectors and cooperators’ (energy) contributions to
the Hamiltonian to define what might be called I-payoffs, to avoid confusion
with Eq.14. In the mean field approximation, the Hamiltonian associated
with a defector or cooperator is determined by the equilibrium cooperation
in its environment, M . This can be expressed in terms of the fractions of
defectors and cooperators (Eq. 11), M = p(S0 −∆) + (1− p)(S0 + ∆). The
I-payoffs for cooperating and defecting players can be expressed accordingly,
with a scaling parameter cu to establish a relationship with the payoffs above,
P gC = (1− p)nMC/cu
= (1− p)nM(S0 + ∆)/cu,
P gD = pnMD/cu
= pnM(S0 −∆)/cu. (15)
Because G = n and NC/G = (1 − p), the payoffs can be written as ΠgC =
r(1 − p) + r/n − 1 and ΠgD = r(1 − p), and shown to be identical to the
I-payoffs by solving for cu and r in terms of unknown n, p, S0, and ∆, using
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for example Wolfram Mathematica. A unique solution exists, with
r =
np(∆− S0)
∆(n+ p− np) + S0(2np2 − 3np+ n− p) ,
cu =
M(∆(n+ p− np) + S0(2np2 − 3np+ n− p))
p− 1 . (16)
In particular for r > 1, when cooperation is beneficial, this solution implies
conditions for the fraction of defectors p and sets the scale parameter cu. At
the threshold r = 1 there is a minimum value pmin. For a symmetric system
with S0 = 0, r ≈ p(1− p), pmin ≈ 0.5, and cu becomes small. By increasing
the asymmetry parameter S0, Eq. 16 shows that pmin is also increasing. Hence
increasing S0 shifts the threshold value of cooperation to a higher fraction of
defectors and increases the payoff of cooperation with respect to pmin = 0.5.
Note that in the Ising model the values for p are established by T , and S0
and ∆ can’t by freely chosen.
With cu and r properly instantiated we showed that there is an identity
relation between payoffs and I-payoffs: ΠgC = P
g
C and Π
g
D = P
g
D. This relation
is simpler than the quantum physics used to relate payoffs to a symmetric
Ising model [37, 38].
Discussion
The asymmetric Ising model provides an explanation for the “spontaneous”
outbreak of cooperation in uncertain situations when the usual provisions
for cooperation, in particular reliable information, institutions and selective
incentives are insufficient or non-available. Instead of rational decision mak-
ers, individuals under uncertainty are assumed to be conformists, responding
to their immediate social environment with a margin of error determined by
random noise. They may have expectations of payoffs that have consequences
for the critical mass and the tipping point (Fig. 2). Eventual payoffs, how-
ever, depend on opponents’ actions and changing circumstances that are
rarely known in advance. The Ising model does not require any knowledge
or accurate expectations, though, and only depends on conformism. Because
the model’s assumptions on psychology and information are general, it might
also apply to other species.
In actuality there are often leaders in play who take the initiative, who
can be incorporated in the model as early cooperators who receive much
attention, i.e. the ones with highest indegree. Numerical simulations point
out that they can win over defectors at lower Tc than cooperators with low
indegree can.
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If there is low uncertainty in relatively simple situations that make freerid-
ing tempting, pro-social institutions may be imposed to nudge participants
towards cooperation. These institutions can be easily incorporated as fields,
which then foster cooperation without phase transition at T < Tc. The ac-
tual maintenance of these institutions, however, will entail additional costs
over and above the contributions. Along with empirical testing, follow-up
studies may examine local variations of noise, conformism and topology.
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